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The Icelandic presidential election of 2024: strategic voting in a second order election?

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Abstract

Icelandic presidential elections are under-studied in the field of political science. We examine the determinants of vote choice in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election and, in particular, whether the election can be characterised as a second-order election, where voters' views about parliamentary politics are more important than their views on the presidency. We rely on data from four surveys focusing on various aspects of the 2024 election to investigate which factors were the most important drivers of vote choice, whether voters voted strategically against the candidate most associated with the incumbent government, and whether the election results might have been different under alternative voting systems. Our findings suggest that attitudes towards the national government were the strongest determinants of vote choice in the election and that strategic voting appears to have played an important role in shaping the outcome. However, views about the role of the president also played a role and

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the eventual winner, Halla Tómasdóttir, would likely have won under any of the voting systems considered. We conclude with a discussion of how our results affect interpretations of the Icelandic presidency and the presidential mandate.

Keywords: The presidency; strategic voting; electoral behaviour; Icelandic politics; semi-presidentialism.

Introduction

> "Each time that the Icelandic people elected a new president in the 20th century, they chose the candidate that they thought stood furthest from the political power centre." (Jóhannesson 2016, 197)

Presidential elections in Iceland are a rather strange affair. Anyone who can collect 1,500 signatures can run for office. The political parties do not endorse candidates and the person receiving a plurality of votes is elected. Campaigning is carried out by ad hoc organizations based on the personal networks of candidates, who in most cases avoid making clear or controversial policy statements (Kristinsson 1996). Candidates are often well-known people from different spheres of society such as academia, culture, business, or media – but some also have an extensive background in politics. What are the primary drivers of voting behaviour in such an unstructured electoral context?

In this paper, we explore what factors were most important in shaping voters' candidate choice in the Icelandic presidential election of 2024; in particular, to what extent factors particular to the presidency were important, as opposed to voters' more general partisan feelings, and to what extent strategic voting may have affected the results, given the electoral system used (first past the post, FPTP).

We suggest that given the relatively limited powers of the Icelandic president it is potentially rewarding to study Icelandic presidential elections as second order elections (SOE) (Reif & Schmitt 1980), reflecting prevailing views on national political parties and the government as much as the merits of different candidates and views on the presidency. Specifically, the expectation is generally that "governments lose" in SOEs. But we also argue that this dynamic may encourage strategic voting in elections where there is not simply one clear alternative to the incumbent government, especially where candidates do not carry official party labels (as in Icelandic presidential elections): in these cases, we expect voters to strategically coordinate on an alternative to a candidate associated with the government, if and when they intend to use their vote as a SOE protest vote to ensure that the latter loses the election. This perspective has been used before to study turnout in presidential elections (Elgie & Fauvelle-Aymar 2012) but not, to our knowledge, the determinants of vote choice in such elections, or Icelandic elections in particular. In the context of the 2024 election, this may have led to strategic voting against the candidate most associated with the incumbent government: the former PM of that government, Katrín Jakobsdóttir.

Our findings indicate that attitudes towards the incumbent government were, indeed, the strongest predictors of vote choice: Jakobsdóttir was clearly opposed by a bloc

of voters who did not trust the government and by those who supported other political parties than her former party, the Left Greens, and these were the strongest predictors of not voting for her and of voting for the winner of the election, Halla Tómasdóttir. This negative attitude may have contributed to voters strategically coordinating to ensure the victory of another candidate, which suggests that the election was likely second-order to an extent: voters' dislike of the national government was the strongest correlate of vote choice that we can find. However, turnout in the elections was about as high as in parliamentary elections and factors more particular to the presidency also played a role: especially voters' views on whether the president should refuse to countersign bills into law based on public demand or private assessment. We also find that Tómasdóttir was the preferred candidate of a plurality of voters and would likely have won under any of the election systems under consideration in our analysis: strategic voting appears to have played an important role in the election, without being decisive in determining the winner. Thus, Icelandic presidential elections only partly fit the model of second order elections, in line with Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar's (2012, 1617) argument that "the distinction should be understood as a continuum".

1. Icelandic semi-presidentialism

The Icelandic system of government is semi-presidential, combining direct election of the president with parliamentary government (Duverger 1980). While semi-presidential systems vary with respect to presidential power, it is Duverger's contention that direct election provides a degree of democratic legitimacy which may enable incumbents to interpret their powers in an expansive manner.

The emphasis on direct election raises questions concerning the way presidents are elected in semi-presidential systems and the nature of their political mandate. Presidents selected with an absolute majority of votes and sincere voting may be considered to have a relatively strong mandate, especially if policy issues are addressed openly during the campaign. If the issues and alternatives and the bases on which people vote are muddled, however, the mandate is less clear.

Until the 1990s, interpretations of the role of the Icelandic president largely favoured a symbolic view, as a figurehead rather than a political leader. In fact, early drafts of the Icelandic constitution in 1944 were written largely to enable the president to overtake the role of the Danish king and intended for the president to be selected by parliament. This was not well received by the public and parliament quickly reverted to direct election in the final version of the constitution (Kristjánsdóttir 2010; Kristjánsson 2002), without intending the president to be politically powerful. In the early years of the republic the political role of the president was unsettled. The first public contest for the office, in 1952, was partisan in the sense that the political parties officially supported candidates (Jóhannesson 2016). Failure of the largest parties to secure a favourable outcome, however, appears to have convinced them from 1968 onwards that taking a public stance in presidential elections was not worth the risk (and they were likely wary of it backfiring) (Hardarson 1997; Jóhannesson 2016, 164–165).[1]

Given the scant political influence of the president in Icelandic politics – Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar (2012) classify the Icelandic presidency as one of the three least politically powerful out of the 39 semi-presidential countries they examine (see also Siaroff (2003)) – presidential elections have not been a high priority of political science research in Iceland. The election of former political science professor Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson as president in 1996, however, changed this to some extent. He showed an appetite for expanding the political role of the presidency and often referred to his direct relationship to the electorate as a strong mandate for political intervention (Thorarensen & Óskarsdóttir 2015). In his 20 years in office, he refused to sign bills from parliament into law on three occasions (a bill on the media in 2004 and two bills related to settling the Icesave dispute in 2010 and 2011) and none of the bills came to pass (the first was withdrawn by parliament, the second two rejected in subsequent referenda) (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2005, 2011, 2012). While his interpretation of the presidency remains controversial, presidential elections have increasingly been the subject of political research from the time of his elections. This research has so far suggested that voters' demographic characteristics, candidates' personal characteristics, and national party-political differences have all played a role to varying extents in previous elections, but the extent to which each type of dynamic is a dominant feature has not yet been explicitly examined (Kristinsson 1996; Kristinsson et al. 2012).

1.1 The presidential election as a second-order election

It is possible that voters perceive candidates to be associated with political parties, even if the parties do not formally nominate or endorse them, especially if candidates have a prominent history of affiliation with a political party (or parties). If a candidate is associated with incumbent government parties, voters might use their presidential vote to express their disapproval of the government. Thus, Icelandic presidential elections might be considered as "second-order" elections. The same may be true for other semi-presidential systems and especially so in countries where presidents tend to be non-partisan. While presidents in semi-presidential systems tend to be partisan, non-partisan presidents are not uncommon – over a quarter were non-partisan between 1995-2015 (Elgie 2018, 138).

The concept of second order elections was coined by Reif and Schmitt (1980) to explain potential biases in how elections to the European Parliament reflected the political balance of forces in Europe. Since then, the concept has been widely used to account for "secondary" elections, such as local or regional elections and supranational ones (e.g. Schakel 2015; Schmitt et al. 2020). The perspective has also been applied to semi-presidential elections, suggesting an inverse relationship between semi-presidential power and turnout in legislative elections (Elgie & Fauvelle-Aymar 2012). The study of semi-presidential elections, however, is an emerging field, where much remains to be learned (e.g. Jastramskis 2021; Magalhães 2007).

Second-order elections (SOE) are considered less important than "first-order" elections (FOE), where voters decide on the government of their countries (directly in

presidential systems and indirectly in parliamentary systems). Voting behaviour in second-order elections is thus considered more likely to be shaped by exogenous factors, such as voters' orientations towards the subjects of the first-order elections (i.e., their national government).

According to the SOE model, we should expect lower turnout in presidential elections than in parliamentary elections in Iceland (Elgie & Fauvelle-Aymar 2012) and we should also expect broader political factors to have a stronger impact on vote choice than factors more particular to the elections, such as the candidates' character and views about the presidency. In elections of limited political significance, it may be difficult to get voters' attention and their knowledge of the candidates and issues particular to those elections is therefore likely to be limited. Moreover, the outcome may not matter much to voters, who might therefore be less inclined to vote than in first-order elections, and more likely to use their votes expressively (e.g., to express broader grievances) rather than instrumentally with regard to the presidency itself.

As Reif and Schmitt (1980, 9–10) put it, we generally expect that "government parties lose" in second-order elections. This negative effect on party/candidate support partly reflects the "cost of ruling" for government parties in parliamentary democracies (Nannestad & Paldem 2002) and is likely to be largest near the middle of a government's electoral term (Müller & Louwerse 2020). This is relatively straightforward to assess when the partisanship of the candidates running for the office mirrors that of the national parties, but the matter becomes more complicated when individuals run as candidates without any official backing from political parties, as has been the case in Iceland since 1968. In part because the role of the president has long been seen as symbolic or ceremonial, the position has tended to attract candidates from outside the political establishment (Jóhannesson 2016). However, while non-politicians have outnumbered politicians among candidates for the office, (former) politicians have occasionally been among the candidates when the incumbent president has not sought re-election.[2] Politicians who have sought the presidency have generally tended to downplay their party affiliation, which is likely a sensible strategy in a multiparty system where no party has been supported by a majority of the population (and likely informed by the historic defeats of the partisan candidate for president in 1952 (Hardarson 1997; Jóhannesson 2016)).

1.2 Strategic voting in a second order election

While candidates for president in Iceland generally tend to disavow or deemphasize their former political affiliation, this does not imply that voters necessarily take that message on board and ignore the candidates' past. To the extent that particular candidates are strongly associated with political parties in voters' minds, we might expect SOE mechanisms to play a role: when they are associated with the incumbent government, the mechanism of "governments losing" might shape the electoral fortunes of those candidates. However, what it means for the government to "lose" in second-order elections has not been sufficiently unpacked in the previous literature: to protest a government

in SOEs, voters might not simply want to vote for any other party or candidate. They might, instead, want to maximize the chances that the "government's candidate" (or party) will *lose* the elections overall, as this would send a clearer signal than a slightly lower winning vote share.

From this perspective, voters wishing to punish the government may face a challenge in elections where there are multiple viable candidates: simply voting against the candidate is not enough. If they want that candidate to lose the election, they may instead want to coordinate on one of the candidates not 'representing' the government, to ensure that this candidate wins instead. Thus, there may be an incentive for voters to vote strategically, that is, to vote for a candidate other than their most preferred one to affect the outcome of the election (Blais et al. 2001). However, in Icelandic presidential elections, a problem arises: they lack the efficient cue of party-backing that is typically present in SOEs, so they can't just (for example) vote for the candidate representing the biggest opposition party. Voters intending to punish the government may thus need to coordinate amongst themselves over which alternative candidate to vote for, to avoid spreading their votes inefficiently

The use of the FPTP electoral system in Icelandic presidential elections should also incentivize strategic voting against candidates associated with the government. No electoral system is immune to strategic voting but the opportunities and incentives to vote strategically vary significantly across both electoral systems and political contexts, and FPTP is a system that provides strong incentives to vote strategically (see, e.g., Abramson et al. 2010). To see why, suppose there is a single right-wing candidate supported by 40% of the voters and two left-wing candidates, each supported by 30% of the voters, and that all the left-wing voters prefer either of the left-wing candidates to the right-wing candidate. If everyone votes sincerely, that is, for their preferred candidate, then the right-wing candidate wins a plurality of the vote. Thus, the voters' failure to vote strategically leads to an outcome where each of the losers of the election are preferred over the winner by a majority of voters. The voters on the left, therefore, have a clear incentive to vote strategically and to coordinate on one of the left candidates.

There is, however, no guarantee that voters will vote strategically. Sticking with the example above, the first challenge facing the voters on the left is how to coordinate their actions. If the two left candidates appear evenly matched, voters may fail to coordinate their actions. However, if one of, e.g., the left-wing candidates is perceived to be more popular, it may appear natural for voters on the left to coordinate on that candidate, and pre-election polls may serve as a coordinating device in that regard (Fey 1997). Thus, the expectation would be that it becomes clearer over the duration of the campaign how best to vote strategically.[3] In other instances, only two candidates can reasonably be considered viable to begin with, in which case the supporters of other candidates have an incentive to vote for the 'lesser evil' in the hope of affecting the outcome of the election. In this light, we would expect strategic voting to occur in these elections to the extent that voters have strong views on one or more candidates (perhaps because of their perceived associations with the government or parliamentary politics more broadly) and for

this tendency to increase as the elections grow nearer and voters increasingly attempt to coordinate their strategic vote.[4]

A simple benchmark for assessing the extent of strategic voting is simply to consider what the outcome of the election would have been had everyone voted sincerely. However, while academically interesting, this does not answer the more practical question of what the outcome of the election might have been under alternative electoral systems. If voters do act strategically, it is of little practical use to focus on an 'ideal' world where they do not. The more practical question requires a comparison of the actual results with potential results using different electoral systems. Three alternative systems are prominent options: the alternative vote (AV) ranked choice voting system, the Borda count ranked choice voting system, and approval voting.[5] None of these systems are immune to strategic voting, but they differ significantly in terms of how easy it is for voters to vote strategically.

The first system we consider is the *alternative vote* (AV). The alternative vote is a ranked-choice system that asks the voter to rank the candidates – sincere voters would rank them in order of preference, but strategic voters may choose to rank them differently. After the ballots are cast, the number of votes that rank each candidate first are tallied – if a candidate wins a majority of the vote they are elected. If not, the candidate who the fewest voters ranked first is eliminated and the second ranked candidates on those ballots are considered the first choice of those voters. This procedure is then repeated until one candidate has won a majority of the vote. This system is sometimes called "the instant runoff"; as Arend Lijphart (1994, 19) noted, it "may be thought of as a refinement of the majority-runoff formula in the sense that weak candidates are eliminated one at a time (instead of all but the top two candidates at the same time) and that voters do not have to go to the polls twice."

Under AV, voters are allowed to vote according to their genuine preference, secure in the knowledge that if their most preferred candidate receives few votes, their vote will not be wasted but instead transferred to their most preferred candidate among those remaining in the contest. Although a voter might still consider voting strategically, perhaps because they fear their first preference candidate will not get a majority but still not be eliminated from the counting quickly enough (or because of a lack of understanding of this procedure), this would be very difficult for the voter to reasonably anticipate, as the vote counting procedure is complicated. Influencing the outcome of the election involves influencing the order in which the candidates are eliminated, which requires far more information about the preferences of other voters than any voter can be expected to have. For all practical purposes, it is reasonable to assume that strategic voting does not occur under the alternative vote.

The second system we consider is the *Borda count*. As with the alternative vote, voters rank the candidates, but in this case, the candidates are awarded *points* based on their rank (see e.g. Fraenkel & Grofman 2014; Stefansson 1991). Typically, the first ranked candidate on each ballot receives a number of points equal to the number of candidates on the ballot, the second ranked candidate receives one point less, and so on, and the

candidate with the highest total of points is declared the winner. While figuring out the optimal ranking of the candidates may not be a trivial exercise for the strategic voter, certain parts of that strategy are relatively obvious. Most importantly, among the viable candidates, the voter may want to rank the candidate posing the greatest threat to their preferred one right at the bottom, irrespective of their sincere preferences.[6]

The third system we consider is the *approval vote*. The approval vote allows the voter to cast a vote for as many candidates as the voter pleases – the idea being that the voter divides the candidates in two groups, those who the voter beliefs are "acceptable" for the office - and those they consider unacceptable (Maniquet & Mongin 2015). The winner is the candidate that receives the most votes. The incentives for strategic voting here are similar to those under the Borda count: a voter may want to avoid giving a vote to a candidate that they genuinely approve of if that candidate poses a threat to a candidate the voter likes more.

2. The 2024 presidential election in Iceland

The announcement of incumbent president Guðni Th. Jóhannesson on New Year's Day 2024 that he would not seek re-election came as something of a surprise (Birgisdóttir 2024). The president was only 56 years old at the time, had only served two terms and had been unusually popular during his entire tenure (Gallup 2024c). Given the choice, Icelandic presidents previously served a minimum of three terms (the first president, Sveinn Björnsson, passed away shortly before completing his second term) (Jóhannesson 2016).

The contest attracted several candidates, with a total of twelve meeting the signature threshold to appear at the ballot. Most notably, the prime minister of Iceland, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, announced on April 5th that she would be stepping down as prime minister and running for president (RÚV 2024). Other notable candidates included Halla Hrund Logadóttir, director-general of Iceland's Energy Authority; Jón Gnarr, comedian and former mayor of Reykjavík for the Best Party (from 2010-14); Baldur Þórhallsson, professor of political science at the University of Iceland; businesswoman Halla Tómasdóttir (who had come second after Jóhannesson in 2016, with 29,3% of the vote); and former judge and Independence Party deputy MP Arnar Þór Jónsson.

While, as in previous presidential elections, the campaign was light on content in terms of policy, there was nevertheless a fairly clear cleavage between candidates: Jakobsdóttir had stepped down as prime minister of a fairly unpopular government (Gallup 2024b) to run for president a few weeks before the election. Jakobsdóttir had enjoyed the greatest trust out of all members of the cabinet: about 34% in November 2023, although this was down from about 43% a year before (Maskína 2023). However, her party, the Left-Greens, was polling lower than it had since first entering Alþingi in 1999, with its support collapsing rapidly after they entered government with the Independence Party and the Progressive Party in 2017 (and resumed the same coalition partnership in 2021) and many of the party's former supporters arguing that it had abandoned its principles in its coalition partnership with parties on the right wing (Sigfúsdóttir 2017). Figure 1 shows this collapse in support for the Left-Greens (i. "Vinstri Græn") since 2017, using

data from monthly Gallup polls going back to 2004, as well as the decline in support for the two governments led by Jakobsdóttir.[7]



Figure 1. Support for the Left Greens (and eight other major political parties) for parliamentary elections in Iceland since 2004, and support for the two governments led by Katrín Jakobsdóttir since 2017. The dashed vertical line marks the date that this government formally took office Source: Gallup polling data (Gallup 2024a)

Although Jón Gnarr (former mayor for the Best Party and campaign advisor for the Social Democrats in 2017), Baldur Þórhallsson (deputy member of parliament for the Social Democratic Alliance for brief periods in 2011 and 2012) and Arnar Þór Jónsson (deputy member of parliament for the Independence Party from 2021 to 2024) also had political backgrounds, these connections were naturally much less prominent in the 2024 campaign than Jakobsdóttir's connection with the incumbent government that she led until two months prior to the election. If this characterization of the campaign is accurate, then the challenge facing those voters who primarily did not want Jakobsdóttir to be elected was that of coordination: to figure out which of the other candidates to cast their votes for.

Figure 2 shows support for each of the six major candidates (the other six candidates usually polled with about 0-1% support, never above 3%) from 27 polls conducted by five Icelandic pollsters from April 5th (when Jakobsdóttir announced her candidacy) and until election day (June 1st), as well as the share of votes that the candidates ended up receiving in the election. As these show, pre-election polls showed a lot of movement: in the beginning of the period, Þórhallsson was polling as a close second to Jakobsdóttir, but Logadóttir subsequently surged to about 30% support a month prior to the election. Tómasdóttir was polling with about 5% support at that point, but she then started a similarly dramatic rise in the polls, which culminated in her election victory on June 1st, when she received 34.2% of the vote to Jakobsdóttir's 25.2%. Throughout this period, Jakobsdóttir had been

polling with a remarkably stable 25-30% support in the polls, whereas support for her apparent three main challengers changed dramatically over the course of the campaign.

As such, these polling trends appear to conform with the notion of the election as a strategic second-order election (SOE), where substantial segments of the electorate may have voted strategically against the candidate associated with the incumbent government: a large portion of voters appear to have oscillated between different alternatives to the candidate most associated with the government, before converging (or coordinating) on Tómasdóttir in the end. However, these polling trends do not in and of themselves demonstrate that this was the reason behind these changes in support: they are also likely to have been driven by dynamics of the campaign and the candidates' performance, such as the lauded performance of Tómasdóttir in the first major TV debate on May 3rd (Magnúsdóttir 2024), after which her support started to rise.



Figure 2. Support for each of six major candidates in polls before the 2024 Icelandic presidential elections (local polynomial regression lines used for smoothed trendlines), as well as their vote share in the elections. Shapes indicate which pollster conducted each poll (and the election results)

As mentioned above, another potential indicator of SOEs is low voter turnout compared with first-order elections. Figure 3 presents the voter turnout rates in presidential elections in Iceland alongside those for parliamentary elections (first-order) and local elections (second-order) since the dawn of the republic (in 1944). This shows that turnout was indeed lower in Iceland's first presidential elections in 1952 than in parliamentary elections in that period and much closer to turnout in local elections, which fits with a model of presidential elections a SOE. However, turnout in the 1968, 1980, 1996 and 2024 elections was completely on par with parliamentary elections – which runs counter to the SOE model. In 1988, 2004, 2012 and 2020, the incumbent president was running against challengers and in these elections, turnout was even lower than in local elections. In all cases except 2012, those challengers had no realistic chance of victory (Hardarson 1997; Hardarson & Kristinsson 2005, 2013, 2017, 2021; Jóhannesson 2016; Kristinsson 1996). Finally, turnout in the competitive elections of 2016 was in the mid-range, but closer to turnout in the parliamentary elections that year than to the local elections of 2014 and 2018. Thus, turnout in competitive presidential elections has been very similar to that in parliamentary elections, which runs counter to a conception of the former as second-order elections.



Figure 3. Voter turnout in parliamentary, presidential and local elections in Iceland, 1944-2024

Source: Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa Íslands 2024)

To explore potential reasons for the differences in voter turnout between the competitive presidential elections of 2016 and 2024, Figure 4 shows data for turnout by age bracket in these elections, which has been collected in recent elections by Icelandic authorities. This suggests that the turnout increase was largely driven by increases among the youngest age groups, which may be related to Tómasdóttir's efforts to mobilise young voters, including a somewhat viral TikTok-campaign (Daðason 2024).



Figure 4. Voter turnout by age bracket in the Icelandic presidential elections of 2016 and 2024

Source: Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa Íslands 2024)

3. Data and methods

To examine to what extent the Icelandic presidential election in 2024 can be described as a second-order election (SOE) and to what extent strategic voting impacted the vote, we use data from four surveys conducted before and immediately after the election: one in-depth online survey with a convenience sample and three surveys conducted with probability-based online panels. Probability-based online panels are generally associated

with high data quality, although in pre-election polls, high respondent engagement can affect accuracy (Callegaro et al. 2014).

First, we use data from an "Online Election" convenience sample poll conducted by the authors: this was a non-representative survey conducted online, with self-selected participation. Here, participants were asked to vote for president using four different electoral systems (FPTP, AV, Borda, and approval voting) and were also asked various questions pertinent to the elections – such as their views on the important qualities of a presidential candidate and on the role of the presidency. In addition, they were asked about political trust, interest, and which party they would vote for in a parliamentary election.

We promoted this survey via major news media outlets – primarily mbl.is and RÚV (Karlsson 2024; mbl.is 2024) - and social media, launching it on Tuesday, May 27th and collecting data through election day (June 1st). In total, we received 2,913 responses to the primary questions posed at the beginning of the survey: a) who respondents intended to vote for in the election and b) who they would most want to see as president, regardless of who they would vote for. 2,459 respondents then "voted" for candidates with the AV system, 2,429 with the Borda system and 2,814 in the approval vote. About 61% (1,771) of these responses were collected on the first day, 11% (312) on the 28th and 21% (602) on the 31st (when RÚV published a story about it).

Second, we use data from a survey conducted by the research firm Maskína on May 31st, using their online panel of respondents. This survey gathered 2,488 responses and asked respondents who they would vote for in the elections the next day, how they would rank order all of the candidates in terms of their likelihood of voting for them, which candidate they would be "content" (i. sátt(ur)) with as president, and which of a few pairs of candidates they would vote for if surveys on election day clearly showed two candidates in the lead.

Third, we use data from a survey conducted by the research firm Prósent on May 27th-28th using their online panel of respondents. This survey gathered 1,438 responses and asked respondents a) who they would vote for as president, b) who they would vote for if that candidate was not running, and c) who they would vote for if *that* candidate was not running.

Fourth, we use data from a post-election survey conducted by the Social Science Research Institute (SSRI) at the University of Iceland on June 3rd (the Monday following the election). The sample was drawn from a probability-based online panel maintained by the SSRI and a total of 1,571 responses were gathered.[8]

We use the data from the Online Election for the bulk of our analysis: on the relative role of different considerations (more or less directly relevant to the presidency) in shaping vote choice in these elections and how voters might have voted under different electoral systems. The three other surveys are used to provide a benchmark from surveys which used more representative sampling methods, to get a sense of how generalizable the findings from the self-selected survey might be, and what these more representative surveys tell us about strategic voting and candidate ranking.

To examine determinants of vote choice, we use OLS models of respondents' choice of candidates under the current system, including as independent variables a) their gender, age, level of education and political interest (to account for potential confounders due to likely demographic and political engagement skews in our self-selected sample), b) their trust in the incumbent government and which party they would vote for in parliamentary elections (as first-order factors), and c) their views about the presidency and which candidate qualities they value most in the elections (as second-order factors).[9] To the extent that b) is more strongly associated with vote choice than c), we believe this would provide more support for understanding the election as a second-order election.

In terms of the more particular research question about the extent of strategic voting, we will present descriptive statistics from the different surveys about respondents' genuine candidate preferences, to what extent they might have voted differently under different electoral systems, and the overall level of support for each of the candidates (e.g., when considering voters' preference ranking and approval) compared with the actual results of the elections. To the extent that these different measures differ from the results of the elections or suggest voters coordinating on particular candidates, we can say that they were likely affected by strategic voting.

4. Drivers of candidate choice: first or second order?

Beginning with the results from our Online Election, Figure 5 shows the raw (unweighted) proportions of respondents in that survey who said they would vote for each of the six top candidates[10] in the elections, compared with the vote share that the candidates received in the election and with raw proportions from the Prósent probability-based online panel survey conducted on May 27th (when most responses to the Online Election were also collected). These indicate that the self-selected sample appears remarkably representative of the general voting population when it comes to candidate support: the main exceptions are a moderate underestimation of support for Tómasdóttir and Gnarr and overestimation of support for Þórhallsson and Jónsson. This is unsurprising given the pattern shown in Figure 2, where polls generally differed from the election results by the same pattern, and support for Tómasdóttir increased rapidly even in the final days before the election. Nevertheless, in the following analyses we weight respondents by candidate support to reflect the results of the election, in the hope that this results in a better estimate of what the results of hypothetical presidential elections might have been under different electoral systems.



Figure 5. Raw (unweighted) proportions who said they would vote for each of the six major candidates in the Online Election survey, compared with the same proportions in the Prósent survey and the election results

Turning to the drivers of candidate choice in these elections, we create six dummy variables indicating respondents' intention to vote for each of the six major candidates. Figure 6 presents the results of OLS regression analyses where each of these variables in turn are the dependent variable and the independent variables are respondents' demographics and their views on the "first-order" arena: which political party they would vote for in a parliamentary election (where the Social Democratic Alliance (i. Samfylkingin) is the reference category) and how much they trust the incumbent national government.[11] The strongest associations reported here are that respondents who had more trust in the government, and those who intended to vote for the Left Greens, were substantially more likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir than those who had less trust in the government or intended to vote for other parties, and less likely to vote for Tómasdóttir (the reverse interpretation is also valid: those with less trust in the government were more likely to vote for Tómasdóttir and less likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir).

Figure 6 presents coefficient plots from these OLS models with 95% confidence interval bands, where all variables have been standardized to range from 0 to 1. This means that, for example, the 0.55 coefficient ($p < 0.001$) for the trust variable in the model for Jakobsdóttir means that respondents with the highest level of trust (10 on the original scale) are predicted to be 55% more likely than those with the lowest level of

trust (0) to vote for her – and the 0.42 coefficient ($p < 0.001$) for the Left Greens means that voters of that party were 42% more likely to vote for her, even accounting for trust



Figure 6. First-order drivers of candidate choice in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election. Data from the Online Election survey

in the government and the other variables (on the interpretation of coefficients from OLS models with binary dependent variables, see Gomila 2021; Hellevik 2009). Other associations are smaller, but voters of the Centre Party and the People's Party were more likely to vote for Jónsson, and voters of the Socialist Party more likely to vote for Jón Gnarr. Voters with lower trust in the government were also more likely to vote for Tómasdóttir or Logadóttir, whereas older voters were more likely to vote for Logadóttir or Jakobsdóttir but less likely to vote for Tómasdóttir.

Moving on to potential second-order drivers of candidate choice – those particular to the presidency – Figure 7 presents the results of similar models where the vote choice and trust-in-government variables have been replaced by variables indicating a) which personal characteristics (or 'traits') respondents said were most important in determining their vote for president and b) respondents' views on four potential roles of the president in Icelandic politics – as well as their trust in the presidency. We show the weighted averages of responses to these questions (where each respondent could choose up to three traits) in Appendix C: they indicate that candidates' knowledge (chosen by 53% of respondents) and honesty (chosen by 51%) were by far considered the most important traits, followed by competence at home (37%) and abroad (32%) and then their policies (25%). In terms of roles, respondents generally said that refusing to countersign bills because of public demands was most desirable (giving this an average of 7.7 on a scale from 0-10) but doing so based on the candidates' own assessment was deemed far less desirable (0.41); the president trying to use the letter of the constitution to be more involved in politics (0.36) and the president shaping their own foreign policy (0.3) followed closely.

Figure 7 shows that an emphasis on candidates' knowledge and competence (whether home or abroad) was significantly positively associated with voting for Jakobsdóttir, whereas emphasizing honesty was negatively associated with voting for her. Conversely, emphasizing honesty was positively associated with voting for Tómasdóttir and emphasizing domestic competence negatively associated. Meanwhile, those who prioritized a candidates' education (6% of respondents) were more likely to vote for Logadóttir, prioritizing coming across as like "the common people" (i. "alþýðleiki", 17%) was associated with voting for Gnarr, and prioritizing a candidate's spouse (1%) or sexuality (1%) was associated with voting for Þórhallsson. Turning to the roles of the president, those who wanted the president to refuse countersigning bills based on public demands were more likely to vote for Tómasdóttir and less likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir – and the opposite applies to those who wanted that decision based on the president's own assessment. Those who wanted the president to become more active in politics were more likely to vote for Jónsson, however, but much less likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir. Perhaps relatedly, those with higher trust in the presidency were more likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir but much less likely to vote for Jónsson (and vice versa).



Figure 7. Second-order drivers of candidate choice in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election. Data from the Online Election survey



Figure 8. Drivers of candidate choice in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election, full model. Data from the Online Election survey

Figure 8 presents results from models which include all of these variables together, in order to tease out which of them might be confounding the others and which factors stand out as the most robustly associated with candidate choice. Here, the strongest associations (by some margin) are that those who trusted the national government (and those who supported the Left Greens, which are only about 3.7% of respondents) were much more likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir and much less likely to vote for Tómasdóttir (the coefficient for emphasizing a candidate's spouse is larger but based on very few respondents). Some views about roles and traits particular to the presidency are still significant and substantively important – especially the division between voters of Tómasdóttir and Jakobsdóttir in terms of theirs views about the criteria for a president refusing countersignatures and on the importance of honesty on one hand and knowledge on the other (as well as the characteristic of education being an asset for Logadóttir) – but the size of these effects pale in comparison.

4.1 The role of strategic voting

Turning to the potential role of strategic voting in driving the elections results, Figure 9 presents the weighted proportion of respondents who said they most wanted each candidate to be president (i.e., their sincere preference or favourite), comparing this with



Figure 9. Proportion of respondents in the Online Election who said they would most like each of the six major candidates to be president, that they would vote for them in the FPTP system, rank them in 1st place in the AV system and rank them in 1st place in the Borda count (weighted)

their vote under FPTP (these are the election results, since the data are weighted on this variable) and which candidate they would rank in first place in AV on one hand and the Borda count on the other. This shows that 27% said they would most like Tómasdóttir as president, compared with 34% who voted for her.[12] The difference is smaller for Jakobsdóttir (23% and 25%) and Logadóttir (13% and 16%) and the reverse is true for Gnarr, Þórhallsson and Jónsson. Based on this, it seems that the former three (who were leading in the polls) benefited from strategic voting and the latter three lost votes because of it – but Tómasdóttir was still the favourite candidate of a plurality of voters. Notably, practically no strategic voting is apparent under the AV and Borda systems when it comes to the candidates ranked first.

Figure 10 sheds more light on how the electoral system might have affected the results of the elections, by showing the proportion of votes (or points) received by each candidate under FPTP, Borda and approval voting[13] in the Online Election. This again suggests that Tómasdóttir profited considerably from strategic voting but would still have won under any of the systems considered. Notably, support for Gnarr and Þórhallsson is stronger under the Borda count and approval voting systems than support for Jakobsdóttir and Logadóttir – in contrast to the actual election results: Þórhallsson would have come second in both of these systems, according to these figures, while he came fifth in the election. Figure 11 shows the results of the AV count in the Online Election: this again suggests that Tómasdóttir would have won in this system, beating Jakobsdóttir in the final round with 64% of the vote against 36%.



Figure 10. Results of the Online Election. Proportion of votes or points received by each candidate in three electoral systems (weighted)



Figure 11. Results of the Online Election. Proportion of votes received by each candidate under subsequent counting rounds of the Alternative Vote system (weighted)

Turning to our other survey data sources, Figure C4 and Figure C5 in Appendix C show that using respondents' ranked preferences over candidates in the Maskína and Prósent surveys (not explicitly asking them to vote using AV) produces almost exactly the same results as in Figure 11, except that there, Gnarr gets eliminated from the count before Logadóttir. Similarly, when asked whether they would be "content with" (i. "sátt(ur) með") each candidate as president, 71% of respondents in the Maskína said this of Tómasdóttir, 53% of Þórhallsson, 48% of Logadóttir, 47% of Jakobsdóttir, 45% of Gnarr and 18% of Jónsson - these numbers are very similar to those in the approval vote in the Online Election, and the rank-order of candidates is the same.[14]

Our survey data also provide other ways to explore the role of strategic voting in the election. In the immediate aftermath of the election (on June 3rd), the SSRI asked respondents whether they had voted strategically themselves. Around one in eight respondents (13%) reported doing so and an interesting picture emerges when examining this by candidate: this phenomenon is almost exclusively reported by voters of the three candidates who received the most votes, as seen in Table 1. Notably, a full quarter (25%) of respondents who cast their vote for Tómasdóttir self-report having voted for her for strategic reasons; compared with 7% for Jakobsdóttir. Thus, the rate of strategic voting for the election winner is nearly double that of the full sample. This again suggests that

Tómasdóttir benefited from strategic voting but would likely have won regardless; the margin of her victory (9 percentage points) exceeds the point estimate for the share of the overall sample that self-reported voting strategically for her (8.5%), although this is within the margin of error (±1.4%). In the same survey, 22% of respondents said they approved of strategic voting in general, and 32% said they believed "a large share" of voters voted strategically in this election.[15]

Table 1. Did respondents vote strategically in the elections? Results from the SSRI survey

		Yes, I voted for a candidate that I believed was likely to win despite not being the candidate I believed would be best suited to be president	No, I voted for the candidate I believed would be best suited to be president
	Total	**193 (13%)**	**1277 (87%)**
Voted for	Halla Tómasdóttir	122 (25%)	371 (75%)
	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	24 (7%)	349 (93%)
	Halla Hrund Logadóttir	39 (17%)	192 (83%)
	Jón Gnarr	2 (2%)	148 (98%)
	Baldur Þórhallsson	3 (3%)	122 (97%)
	Arnar Þór Jónsson	1 (2%)	75 (98%)
	Other	0 (0%)	21 (100%)

Note: Respondents were asked: "Did you vote strategically in the presidential election on June 1st, 2024?" $p<0.001$ (chi-squared test with Rao & Scott's second-order correction). Respondents were weighted to reflect the vote shares obtained in the presidential election.

In the Maskína survey, respondents were asked to rank candidates by how likely they were to vote for them. In Table 2, we use this information to infer which candidate the respondents might have voted for in a two-way contest (e.g., a second round in a run-off election), for all possible pairs of the six major candidates – with the caveat that this these are hypothetical comparisons which respondents were not asked directly about. Here, we see that Jakobsdóttir was ranked below all of these candidates except Jónsson by a majority of respondents, whereas Tómasdóttir was ranked above all other candidates by a majority.[16] Similarly, when respondents in the Maskína survey were asked who they would vote for if polls on election day showed that Jakobsdóttir and each of three main competitors (Tómasdóttir, Logadóttir and Þórhallsson) were the frontrunners, 42-53% said they would switch to her competitor but only 10-22% said they would switch to Jakobsdóttir. When asked about their second preference, respondents in both the Maskína and Prósent surveys were more likely to mention Tómasdóttir, Þórhallsson or Logadóttir than Jakobsdóttir.[17]

Table 2. Which candidates were "preferred" by more voters? Results from the Maskína survey

	Pairwise "opponent" (%)					
Candidate (%)	**vs AÞJ**	**vs BÞ**	**vs HHL**	**vs HT**	**vs JG**	**vs KJ**
Arnar Þór Jónsson		27	26	15	29	39
Baldur Þórhallsson	73		49	28	53	52
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	74	51		31	53	51
Halla Tómasdóttir	85	72	69		70	65
Jón Gnarr	71	47	47	30		53
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	61	48	49	35	47	

Note: Respondents were asked to rank candidates in order of how likely they were to vote for them. Here, we treat this as a measure of respondents' preferences over the candidates and use their ranking to infer how each pair of candidates might have fared against each other in a two-way contest, with the caveat that this is a hypothetical case based on a question that did not directly ask about this.

5. Discussion

What factors are most important in explaining voting behaviour in the 2024 presidential election in Iceland? We have shown that the strongest predictors of vote choice are related to Katrín Jakobsdóttir, the former PM of the incumbent government: Respondents who had more trust in the incumbent government, and those who supported her former party, the Left Greens, were substantially more likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir than those who had less trust in the government or intended to vote for other parties. In turn, the latter were much more likely to vote for the winner of the election, Halla Tómasdóttir. This is consistent with the argument that the 2024 presidential election in Iceland can be considered a second-order election, with attitudes towards (first-order) parliamentary politics playing a substantial role in shaping the outcome of the election (Reif & Schmitt 1980).

Analysing voters' full preferences and their hypothetical voting behaviour under alternative voting systems further suggests that this second-order effect led to voters coordinating against her candidacy: a bloc of voters (about 10%) appears to have voted strategically for Tómasdóttir or (to a lesser extent) Logadóttir to prevent Jakobsdóttir from winning, and these voting intentions appear to have developed over the course of the campaign as these voters coordinated over different alternatives to Jakobsdóttir. According to all of the surveys presented here, Jakobsdóttir was the second preference of considerably fewer voters than most of her major competitors and would have fared worse under the Borda count or approval voting systems, as well as in hypothetical pairwise match-ups – although she would have come second in the AV system in all cases. Þórhallsson and Gnarr appear to have suffered most from this strategic voting while Tómasdóttir gained about 7-8% of the vote from it, indicating that she would likely have won the election without strategic voting, but only barely.

It bears noting, however, that while this story is consistent with the idea of the 2024 presidential election being a second-order election, i.e., voters signalling their displeasure with the government, it is also consistent with a slightly different interpretation in which the election was not a referendum on the government but rather reflecting an assessment of the person of Jakobsdóttir. That is, dissatisfaction with her part in the government coalition (and perhaps with the circumstances of her resigning as PM to run for president) may have been interpreted as a personal failing which impacted on voters' views on her suitability for the presidency. Disentangling these two perspectives is not easy, although we have in our analysis attempted to account for the role of candidate traits in shaping vote choice. Similarly, it may be that supporters of the Left Greens wanted Jakobsdóttir to be president to advance political issues associated with her and that party, but this seems unlikely to have been a driving factor given the apolitical nature of the presidency (and given the role played by trust in the incumbent government, which included parties from across the left-right spectrum).

Having said that, the election does not bear all the hallmarks of a second-order election. First, voter turnout was on par with turnout in parliamentary elections – as indeed it has been in most (competitive) presidential elections in the country since 1968. This is in line with Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar (2012), who find that in presidential elections in even those countries with the least powerful presidents (including Iceland), turnout is typically as high as in FOE. Second, factors particular to the presidency also play a role in shaping vote choice, when accounting for broader political and demographic factors: voters emphasising honesty were more likely than others to vote for Tómasdóttir, as well as those who want the president to refuse countersigning bills based on public demand. Finally, Tómasdóttir was still the preferred candidate of a plurality of voters. While she clearly benefitted from strategic voting, she would likely have won the election under all alternative electoral systems under consideration: the alternative vote, Borda count and approval voting. Her popularity and victory cannot be explained by SOE considerations alone.

We cannot make sweeping generalizations regarding the nature of the presidential mandate in the Icelandic semi-presidential system based on the evidence presented here. However, our results do suggest that at least in some cases, the president appears to have a rather limited mandate for personal political intervention, despite being directly elected. Voting behaviour in the 2024 election appears to have been driven largely by external factors, especially voters' support for or opposition to the incumbent government, and strategic voting played an important part in determining the result. Although Tómasdóttir was certainly popular among voters, their choice of candidates was driven by "presidential" issues to a much smaller degree than by those exogenous political factors, in line with expectations derived from the model of second-order elections, indicating that her voters likely did not intend for her to be very politically pro-active (aside from perhaps refusing to countersign bills based on public demand). Despite Duverger's contention, not every instance of a direct election of a president can thus be used to argue persuasively in favour of an expansive presidential role in semi-presidential systems.

Notes

1 In 1968, leaders of the parties more or less publicly supported different candidates, but the parties did not officially endorse them (Jóhannesson 2016, 129–233).
2 Most years no one has contested a sitting president and in all but one case (in 2012, see Hardarson and Kristinsson 2013) there has been no question that the incumbent would win in a landslide.
3 This does assume that polls capture voters' intentions to vote strategically, even though the voters planning to vote strategically may have an incentive not to reveal their plan to desert their preferred candidate if needed, as they may want other voters to coordinate over their own most preferred candidate.
4 An alternative perspective on the influence of polls is that they may generate a bandwagon effect, which refers to the tendency, or desire, of voters to vote for 'a winner' (see, e.g., Callander 2007). This may well have played a role in Tómasdóttir's (or Logadóttir's) surge in the polls, although it seems unlikely that this was the deciding factor, given that we do not see the same pattern for Jakobsdóttir, despite her leading in the polls for a significant portion of the campaign.
5 Almost all directly elected president elected in the world are elected using first-past-the-post or some variant of the majority run-off. The Irish president is the only president elected using the alternative vote, which is similar to the majority run-off. We also include the Borda count and approval voting as they are options that might have some normatively desirable qualities, such as providing candidates with an incentive to adopt moderate positions and avoid negative campaigning (e.g., Reilly 2002, Yilmaz 1999).
6 The Borda count doesn't always require voters to rank all the candidates, in which case the points left over are split between the unranked candidates. For example, if 10 out of 12 candidates are ranked, the points left over are 2 (for the 11th rank) and 1 (for the 12th rank), and the two unranked candidates would each get 1.5 points. Another version of strategic voting in these cases is to rank as many candidates as possible, in order to award as few points as possible to the candidate that poses the greatest threat to the voter's preferred candidate.
7 The latter is based on a survey question explicitly asking about support for the government. We are grateful to Gallup in Iceland for providing us with access to both sets of data.
8 We are grateful to Maskína, Prósent and the SSRI for providing us with access to data from these surveys.
9 See the questionnaire in the Appendix.
10 Each of the other six candidates received less than 2% in each case.
11 In the Appendix, we present tables with full results from all models presented here. We also present the full model as a multinomial regression model, which shows the same findings as reported here.
12 Of the 7% of respondents who said they voted for Tómasdóttir but that she was not their first preference, about 78% ranked Jakobsdóttir 10th or lower in the AV, suggesting that this was indeed largely driven by voting "against" Jakobsdóttir.
13 In the Borda count, this is the proportion of points that each candidate received out of the maximum number of votes that they could receive in the election (i.e., if every respondent would have ranked them first).
14 These survey responses were weighted by age, sex, residence and education, as well as the results of the presidential elections.
15 See Appendix C3 for further analysis of the SSRI survey.
16 Jakobsdóttir does do better in the Prósent survey data, beating all competitors except Tómasdóttir in similar hypothetical pairwise comparisons; see Appendix C4.
17 See Appendix C2 and C4 for further analysis of these surveys.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Online Elections questionnaire

Forsetakosningar 2024

Velkomin/nn/ð til þátttöku í (óformlegum) netkosningum til embættis forseta Íslands!

Á næstu síðum verður þú beðin/nn/ð um að ímynda þér að þú takir þátt í kosningum til embættis forseta Íslands sem haldnar eru með mismunandi kosningakerfum. Þú færð að greiða atkvæði fjórum sinnum og í hvert skipti er notað nýtt kosningakerfi: fyrst í kosningum þar sem notuð er meirihlutakosning í einni umferð (líkt og í forsetakosningunum á Íslandi), svo raðval með varaatkvæði (e. Alternative Vote), svo raðval með Borda talningu (e. Borda Count) og loks samþykktarkosning (e. Approval Voting). Áður en þú greiðir atkvæði eru birtar upplýsingar um hvernig kosningakerfið virkar. Þátttaka þín ætti að taka á bilinu fimm til fimmtán mínútur - eftir því hversu mikinn tíma þú gefur þér í að kynna þér kosningakerfin og hugleiða valkostina.

Eftir að þú hefur greitt atkvæði munum við spyrja þig nokkurra spurninga. Spurningarnar og kosningin eru hluti af rannsókn okkar á mögulegum áhrifum mismunandi kosningakerfa og hvaða þáttum þau, og val kjósenda á frambjóðendum, gætu tengst. Þú getur kosið að svara þessum spurningum ekki ef þér sýnist svo, sem og hvaða tilteknu spurningu sem er, en við hvetjum þig að sjálfsögðu til að svara þeim, þar sem þau munu gagnast okkur við rannsókn okkar.

Þátttaka þín er valfrjáls og svör þín eru ekki persónugreinanleg. Þau verða skráð í gagnagrunn á netþjóni í Bandaríkjunum án nokkurra auðkenna sem gefa færi á að rekja svörin til þátttakenda. Þú getur valið að svara ekki einstaka spurningum. Hvorki IP-addressur tölvu, stillingar vafra eða nokkrar aðrar upplýsingar sem gera það mögulegt að rekja svör til einstaklinga eru vistaðar.

Niðurstöður netkosningarinnar verða birtar skömmu eftir kosningarnar til embættis forseta Íslands fara fram (1. júní 2024).

Kærar þakkir fyrir að taka þátt.
Indriði H. Indriðason, prófessor í stjórnmálafræði við University of California, Riverside
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Q1 Hvaða frambjóðanda vildir þú helst sjá sem forseta Íslands (óháð því hvern þú ætlar að kjósa)?

- ○ Arnar Þór Jónsson (1)
- ○ Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir (2)
- ○ Ástþór Magnússon Wium (3)
- ○ Baldur Þórhallsson (4)
- ○ Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson (5)
- ○ Halla Hrund Logadóttir (6)
- ○ Halla Tómasdóttir (7)
- ○ Helga Þórisdóttir (8)
- ○ Jón Gnarr (9)
- ○ Katrín Jakobsdóttir (10)
- ○ Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir (11)
- ○ Viktor Traustason (12)
- ○ Veit það ekki (13)

Q2 Ætlar þú að kjósa í forsetakosningunum 1. júní næstkomandi?

- ○ Já, ég er alveg ákveðin/nn/ð í að kjósa (1)
- ○ Já, ég er nokkuð ákveðin/nn/ð í að kjósa (2)
- ○ Já, ég hallast að því að kjósa (3)
- ○ Nei, ég hef kosningarétt en ég ætla ekki að kjósa (4)
- ○ Nei, ég hef ekki kosningarétt (5)
- ○ Ég vil ekki svara spurningunni (6)

Q3 Ef þú myndir kjósa í forsetakosningunum í dag, hvaða frambjóðanda myndir þú kjósa?

- ○ Arnar Þór Jónsson (1)
- ○ Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir (2)
- ○ Ástþór Magnússon Wium (3)
- ○ Baldur Þórhallsson (4)
- ○ Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson (5)
- ○ Halla Hrund Logadóttir (6)
- ○ Halla Tómasdóttir (7)
- ○ Helga Þórisdóttir (8)
- ○ Jón Gnarr (9)
- ○ Katrín Jakobsdóttir (10)
- ○ Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir (11)
- ○ Viktor Traustason (12)
- ○ Myndi skila auðu (13)
- ○ Veit það ekki (14)

Q4 Ímyndum okkur að forsetakosningarnar væru haldnar í dag en notað væri annað kosningakerfi en venjulega.

Eitt af þeim kerfum sem gætu verið notuð er *raðval með varaatkvæði* (e. Alternative Vote): þar geta kjósendur raðað frambjóðendum í forgangsröð á kjörseðli sínum og þegar atkvæði eru talin er fyrst horft á 1. sætið á kjörseðlum. Hafi enginn frambjóðandi hlotið hreinan meirihluta atkvæða (meira en 50%) þá er frambjóðandinn með fæst atkvæði í 1. sæti útilokaður og þeir kjörseðlar sem settu viðkomandi í 1. sæti færðir yfir til þeirra frambjóðanda sem eru í 2. sæti á þeim kjörseðlum. Hafi enginn frambjóðandi þá hlotið hreinan meirihluta atkvæða þá er þessi endurúthlutun endurtekin (frambjóðandinn með fæst atkvæði útilokaður og 2. og 3. sæti þeirra kjörseðla notuð til að flytja þau atkvæði) þangað til einn frambjóðandi hefur fengið hreinan meirihluta. Með þessum hætti er tryggt að enginn frambjóðandi nái kjöri með minnihluta atkvæða, þó hluti atkvæða sigurvegarans geti komið frá kjósendum sem settu viðkomandi ekki í 1. sæti heldur í t.d. 2. eða 3. sæti. Þér er frjálst að raða eins fáum eða mörgum frambjóðendum og þér sýnist.

Hér má finna einfalt dæmi um hvernig kosningakerfið virkar (opnast í nýjum glugga).

Hvernig myndir þú kjósa ef þú værir að kjósa í forsetakosningunum og þetta kosningakerfi - raðval með varaatkvæði - væri notað? Athugaðu að líkt og í raunverulegum forsetakosningum gætir þú viljað taka með í reikninginn hvernig þú telur að aðrir kjósendur myndu líklegast kjósa. Þér er frjálst að mátt raða eins mörgum eða fáum frambjóðendum og þér sýnist.

Röðun
_____ Arnar Þór Jónsson (1)
_____ Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir (2)
_____ Ástþór Magnússon Wium (3)
_____ Baldur Þórhallsson (4)
_____ Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson (5)
_____ Halla Hrund Logadóttir (6)
_____ Halla Tómasdóttir (7)
_____ Helga Þórisdóttir (8)
_____ Jón Gnarr (9)
_____ Katrín Jakobsdóttir (10)
_____ Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir (11)
_____ Viktor Traustason (12)

Q5 Ímyndum okkur áfram að forsetakosningarnar væru haldnar í dag en notað væri annað kosningakerfi en venjulega.

Annað af þeim kerfum sem gætu verið notuð er *raðval með Borda talningu* (e. Borda count): þar geta kjósendur líka raðað frambjóðendum í forgangsröð á kjörseðli sínum en þegar atkvæði eru talin þá fá frambjóðendur mismörg stig eftir því í hvaða sæti þeir eru á hverjum kjörseðli. Eitt algengt afbrigði af þessu kerfi er að frambjóðandinn í neðsta sæti fái eitt stig, frambjóðandinn í næstneðsta sæti fái 1 stig, frambjóðandinn fyrir ofan fái 2 stig og svo koll af kolli. Í þessum forsetakosningum myndi það þýða að frambjóðandinn í 1. sæti fengi 12 stig, frambjóðandinn í 2. sæti 11 stig og svo koll af kolli. Síðan eru stig frambjóðenda einfaldlega talin saman og sá frambjóðandi sem hlýtur flest stig sigrar kosningarnar.

Hér má finna einfalt dæmi um hvernig kosningakerfið virkar (opnast í nýjum glugga).

Hvernig myndir þú kjósa ef þú værir að kjósa í forsetakosningunum og þetta kosningakerfi - raðval með Borda talningu - væri notað? Athugaðu að líkt og í raunverulegum forsetakosningum gætir þú viljað taka með í reikninginn hvernig þú telur að aðrir kjósendur myndu líklegast kjósa.
Þér er frjálst að raða eins fáum eða mörgum frambjóðendum og þér sýnist. Stigin sem fylgja þeim sætum sem ekki er raðað er skipt jafnt á milli frambjóðenda sem ekki var raðað. Svo dæmi sé tekið, ef þú raðar níu af tólf frambjóðendum þá standa sex stig eftir (eitt fyrir síðasta sætið, tvö fyrir það næstneðsta, og þrjú fyrir það þriðja neðsta) og hver frambjóðendanna sem ekki var raðað fær tvö atkvæði.

Röðun
_____ Arnar Þór Jónsson (1)
_____ Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir (2)
_____ Ástþór Magnússon Wium (3)
_____ Baldur Þórhallsson (4)
_____ Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson (5)
_____ Halla Hrund Logadóttir (6)
_____ Halla Tómasdóttir (7)
_____ Helga Þórisdóttir (8)
_____ Jón Gnarr (9)
_____ Katrín Jakobsdóttir (10)
_____ Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir (11)
_____ Viktor Traustason (12)

Q6 Ímyndum okkur áfram að forsetakosningarnar væru haldnar í dag en notað væri annað kosningakerfi en venjulega.

Annað af þeim kerfum sem gætu verið notuð er *samþykktarkosning* (e. approval voting): þar velja kjósendur alla þá frambjóðendur sem þeir styðja, treysta eða geta fellt sig við sem forseta. Engin forgangsröðun á sér stað en kjósandanum er hins vegar frjálst að kjósa eins marga eða eins fáa og honum sýnist; hvort sem það er bara einn frambjóðandi, enginn eða allir tólf. Síðan sigrar einfaldlega sá frambjóðandi sem flest slík atkvæði hlýtur.

Hér má finna einfalt dæmi um hvernig kosningakerfið virkar (opnast í nýjum glugga).

Hvaða frambjóðanda eða frambjóðendur myndir þú kjósa ef þú værir að kjósa í forsetakosningunum og þetta kosningakerfi - samþykktarkosning - væri notað? Athugaðu að líkt og í raunverulegum forsetakosningum gætir þú viljað taka með í reikninginn hvernig þú telur að aðrir kjósendur myndu líklegast kjósa. Þér er frjálst að merkja við eins marga eða fáa frambjóðendur og þér sýnist.

- ○ Arnar Þór Jónsson (1)
- ○ Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir (2)
- ○ Ástþór Magnússon Wium (3)
- ○ Baldur Þórhallsson (4)
- ○ Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson (5)
- ○ Halla Hrund Logadóttir (6)
- ○ Halla Tómasdóttir (7)
- ○ Helga Þórisdóttir (8)
- ○ Jón Gnarr (9)
- ○ Katrín Jakobsdóttir (10)
- ○ Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir (11)
- ○ Viktor Traustason (12)

Q7 Hvert af þessum kosningakerfum myndir þú helst vilja nota við forsetakosningar á Íslandi? Hér getur þú forgangsraðað kerfunum frá 1. sæti (þess sem þú vildir helst nota) til 4. sætis (þess sem þú vildir síst nota)

Röðun
_____ Einfalda meirihlutakosningu (Núverandi kerfi) (1)
_____ Raðval með varaatkvæði (e. Alternative Vote) (2)
_____ Raðval með stigakerfi (Borda talning, e. Borda Count) (3)
_____ Samþykktarkosningu (e. Approval Voting) (4)

Q8 Á kvarða frá 0 til 10, þar sem 0 þýðir "engan áhuga" og 10 þýðir "mjög mikinn áhuga", hversu mikinn áhuga hefur þú...

	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Á þessum forsetakosningum? ()	
Á stjórnmálum almennt séð? ()	

Q9 Hvaða þættir vega þyngst í afstöðu þinni til þess hvaða frambjóðandi þú vilt helst að verði forseti Íslands? Þú mátt velja allt að þremur valkostum hér.

- ○ Heiðarleiki frambjóðandans (1)
- ○ Maki frambjóðandans (2)
- ○ Þekking og reynsla frambjóðandans (3)
- ○ Starfsferill frambjóðandans (4)
- ○ Menntun frambjóðandans (5)
- ○ Hæfni frambjóðandans við skyldur forseta á innlendum vettvangi (6)
- ○ Hæfni frambjóðandans við skyldur forseta á erlendum vettvangi (7)
- ○ Málefnaáherslur frambjóðandans (8)
- ○ Alþýðleiki frambjóðandans (9)
- ○ Forsetaleg ímynd frambjóðandans (10)
- ○ Kynhneigð frambjóðandans (11)
- ○ Fyrri afskipti frambjóðandans af stjórnmálum og þjóðlífi (12)
- ○ Hlýja frambjóðandans (13)
- ○ Kyn frambjóðandans (14)

Q10 Hversu líklegt eða ólíklegt er að þú myndir kjósa þann frambjóðanda sem þú vilt helst sem forseta Íslands, ef þú teldir að það væru ekki raunhæfar líkur á því að viðkomandi sigraði kosningarnar?

- ○ Alveg öruggt (1)
- ○ Mjög líklegt (2)
- ○ Frekar líklegt (3)
- ○ Hvorki líklegt né ólíklegt (4)
- ○ Frekar ólíklegt (5)
- ○ Mjög ólíklegt (6)
- ○ Alveg útilokað (7)
- ○ Veit það ekki (8)

Q11 Á kvarða frá 0 til 10, þar sem 0 þýðir "Mjög óæskilegt" og 10 þýðir "Mjög æskilegt", hversu æskilegt eða óæskilegt telur þú...



Q12 Hvaða stjórnmálaflokk myndir þú kjósa ef gengið væri til alþingiskosninga í dag?

- ○ Flokk Fólksins (1)
- ○ Framsóknarflokkinn (2)
- ○ Miðflokkinn (3)
- ○ Pírata (4)
- ○ Samfylkinguna (5)
- ○ Sjálfstæðisflokkinn (6)
- ○ Sósíalistaflokk Íslands (7)
- ○ Viðreisn (8)
- ○ Vinstrihreyfinguna – grænt framboð (9)
- ○ Annan flokk eða framboð (10)
- ○ Ég myndi skila auðu (11)
- ○ Ég myndi ekki kjósa (12)

Q13 Í stjórnmálum talar fólk stundum um hægri og vinstri. Hvar myndirðu staðsetja sjálfan/nn/t þig á kvarða frá 0 til 10, þar sem 0 er lengst til vinstri og 10 er lengst til hægri?



Q14 Á kvarða frá 0 til 10, þar sem 0 þýðir "ekkert traust" og 10 þýðir "mjög mikið traust", hversu mikið traust berð þú til ...

Q15 Ertu fylgjandi eða andvíg(ur/t) því að...

	Mjög fylgjandi (1)	Frekar fylgjandi (2)	Hvorki fylgjandi né andvíg(ur/t) (3)	Frekar andvíg(ur/t) (4)	Mjög andvíg(ur/t) (5)
Íslensk stjórnvöld fordæmi framgöngu Ísraelsstjórnar á Gaza? (1)	○	○	○	○	○
Ráðist verði í stórtækar virkjanaframkvæmdir á næstu árum? (2)	○	○	○	○	○
Dregið verði verulega úr fjölda innflytjenda, flóttamanna og hælisleitenda sem koma til Íslands? (3)	○	○	○	○	○
Frumvarp matvælaráðherra um lagareldi verði samþykkt nokkurn veginn óbreytt sem lög? (4)	○	○	○	○	○
Ný stjórnarskrá verði samþykkt, byggt á tillögum Stjórnlagaráðs? (5)	○	○	○	○	○

Q16 Hvert er kyn þitt?

- ○ Karl (1)
- ○ Kona (2)
- ○ Kvár (3)
- ○ Annað (4)
- ○ Vil ekki segja (5)

Q17 Hvert er fæðingarár þitt?

_____

Q18 Hvaða námi (hæstu prófgráðu) hefur þú lokið?

- ○ Engu námi lokið (1)
- ○ Grunnskóla (2)
- ○ Starfsnámi (3)
- ○ Verklegu framhaldsnámi (4)
- ○ Bóklegu framhaldsnámi (stúdentsprófi) (5)
- ○ BA/BS prófi eða sambærilegu (6)
- ○ MA/MS prófi eða sambærilegu (7)
- ○ Doktorsprófi (8)
- ○ Vil ekki svara (9)

Appendix B: Regression tables

Table B1. First-order drivers of candidate choice. Results from OLS regression models

	Halla Tómasdóttir	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	Halla Hrund Logadóttir	Jón Gnarr	Baldur Þórhallsson	Arnar Þór Jónsson
Female	0.13 ***	-0.01	-0.07 ***	-0.05 ***	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25-34 years	-0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
35-44 years	-0.05	-0.04	0.05	-0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
45-54 years	-0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
55-64 years	-0.07	0.07	0.10 *	-0.11 **	-0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
65+ years	-0.14 *	0.14 **	0.15 **	-0.15 ***	-0.04	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
University education	-0.01	0.06 **	0.01	-0.03 *	-0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Political interest	-0.10	0.12 **	-0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.04 *
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Progress Party	0.08	-0.04	0.02	-0.05	-0.07 *	0.04 *
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Independence Party	0.15 ***	-0.07 *	-0.02	-0.04 *	-0.08 ***	0.04 **
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Left Greens	-0.22 ***	0.42 ***	-0.09 *	-0.06	-0.08 *	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Pirate Party	-0.09 *	-0.09 **	0.05	0.04	0.07 **	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Liberal Reform	0.10 **	-0.08 **	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)

	Halla Tómasdóttir	**Katrín Jakobsdóttir**	**Halla Hrund Logadóttir**	**Jón Gnarr**	**Baldur Þórhallsson**	**Arnar Þór Jónsson**
Center Party	-0.01	-0.12 ***	-0.02	-0.04	-0.11 ***	0.30 ***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
People's Party	-0.10	-0.07	0.02	-0.00	-0.06	0.17 ***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Socialist Party	-0.23 ***	-0.10	0.14 **	0.19 ***	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Trust in government	-0.21 ***	0.55 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.03	-0.05	-0.06 **
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
R^2	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.20
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.19
Num. obs.	1941	1941	1941	1941	1941	1941

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2. Second-order drivers of candidate choice. Results from OLS regression models

	Halla Tómasdóttir	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	Halla Hrund Logadóttir	Jón Gnarr	Baldur Þórhallsson	Arnar Þór Jónsson
Female	0.10 ***	0.02	-0.08 ***	-0.04 **	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
25-34 years	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.05 *
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
35-44 years	0.02	-0.07	0.04	-0.04	0.00	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
45-54 years	-0.00	-0.00	0.07	-0.08 *	-0.05	0.05 *
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
55-64 years	-0.01	0.04	0.09 *	-0.13 ***	-0.05	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
65+ years	-0.11	0.13 *	0.14 **	-0.14 ***	-0.08 *	0.06 *
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
University education	-0.05	0.05 *	0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Political interest	-0.11 *	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.07 **
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trust in presidency	0.08	0.17 ***	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.17 ***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Role: Sign., public	0.18 **	-0.23 ***	0.08 *	-0.10 **	0.00	0.04 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Role: Sign., own	-0.18 ***	0.07 *	0.06	-0.02	0.01	0.07 ***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Role: Foreign	0.01	-0.07	-0.01	0.09 **	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Role: Politics	0.09 *	-0.21 ***	0.03	-0.03	0.00	0.09 ***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trait: Knowledge	0.02	0.12 ***	-0.03	-0.12 ***	0.03 *	-0.01

	Halla Tómasdóttir	**Katrín Jakobsdóttir**	**Halla Hrund Logadóttir**	**Jón Gnarr**	**Baldur Þórhallsson**	**Arnar Þór Jónsson**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Honesty	0.07 *	-0.10 ***	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Comp., for.	0.03	0.07 **	-0.02	-0.05 **	0.02	-0.05 ***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Comp., dom.	-0.08 *	0.08 **	-0.00	-0.04 *	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Policies	0.02	-0.12 ***	0.07 **	-0.04 *	0.06 **	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Normal	-0.09 **	-0.03	0.07 **	0.07 ***	0.03	-0.04 **
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Warm	-0.01	-0.07 *	0.10 ***	0.02	-0.00	-0.04 **
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Presidential	0.03	-0.01	0.06 *	-0.06 **	0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Previous	-0.09 *	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.05 *	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Career	0.04	-0.02	0.04	-0.05 *	0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trait: Education	-0.11 *	-0.06	0.19 ***	-0.10 ***	0.10 ***	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trait: Gender	0.01	0.10	0.02	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Trait: Spouse	-0.06	-0.11	-0.07	0.03	0.19 **	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Trait: Sexuality	-0.13	-0.07	-0.13	-0.16	0.58 ***	-0.07
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.07)
R^2	0.08	0.25	0.08	0.16	0.04	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.24	0.07	0.15	0.03	0.13
Num. obs.	1881	1881	1881	1881	1881	1881

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3. Drivers of candidate choice, full model. Results from OLS regression models

	Halla Tómasdóttir	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	Halla Hrund Logadóttir	Jón Gnarr	Baldur Þórhallsson	Arnar Þór Jónsson
Female	0.10 ***	0.02	-0.08 ***	-0.03	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
25-34 years	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
35-44 years	0.01	-0.07	0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
45-54 years	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	-0.05	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
55-64 years	0.00	0.03	0.10 *	-0.12 **	-0.05	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
65+ years	-0.06	0.08	0.15 **	-0.14 ***	-0.08	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
University education	-0.03	0.05 *	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Political interest	-0.08	0.10 *	-0.05	-0.04	-0.00	0.06 **
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Progress Party	0.06	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Independence Party	0.16 ***	-0.09 **	-0.01	-0.03	-0.08 **	0.03 *
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Left Greens	-0.19 **	0.37 ***	-0.07	-0.06	-0.08 *	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Pirate Party	-0.03	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.07 **	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Liberal Reform	0.11 **	-0.07 *	-0.02	-0.05 *	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Center Party	0.03	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10 ***	0.23 ***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
People's Party	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	0.15 ***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)

Socialist Party	-0.19 **	-0.02	0.05	0.19 ***	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Trust in government	-0.20 ***	0.43 ***	-0.12 **	-0.02	-0.08 *	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trust in presidency	0.12	-0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.12 ***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Role: Sign., public	0.16 **	-0.14 **	0.05	-0.11 **	-0.02	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Role: Sign., own	-0.16 ***	0.05	0.07	-0.02	0.03	0.05 **
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Role: Foreign	0.00	-0.07	0.03	0.08 *	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Role: Politics	0.11 *	-0.14 ***	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.05 **
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trait: Knowledge	0.01	0.09 ***	-0.02	-0.10 ***	0.04 *	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Honesty	0.08 *	-0.09 ***	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Comp., for.	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.04 *	0.01	-0.03 *
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Comp., dom.	-0.05	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Policies	0.02	-0.10 ***	0.06 *	-0.03	0.04	0.03 *
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Normal	-0.09 *	-0.02	0.06 *	0.07 **	0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Warm	0.02	-0.07 *	0.09 **	0.02	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Presidential	0.02	-0.03	0.07 *	-0.05 *	0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Trait: Previous	-0.05	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05 *	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)

Trait: Career	0.04	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trait: Education	-0.12 *	-0.08	0.20 ***	-0.09 **	0.09 **	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Trait: Gender	0.00	0.12 *	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Trait: Spouse	-0.00	-0.11	-0.10	0.00	0.21 **	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Trait: Sexuality	-0.14	-0.01	-0.18	-0.16	0.52 ***	-0.01
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)
R^2	0.10	0.35	0.10	0.17	0.09	0.24
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.33	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.22
Num. obs.	1614	1614	1614	1614	1614	1614

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4. Drivers of candidate choice, full model. Results from a *multinomial logit* regression model

	Arnar Þór Jónsson	Baldur Þórhallsson	Halla Hrund Logadóttir	Halla Tómasdóttir	Jón Gnarr
Female	-0.2296	-0.1953	-0.7273***	0.2082	-0.5409
	(0.3789)	(0.2082)	(0.2088)	(0.1741)	(0.2842)
18-24 years	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
25-34 years	3.0758*	-0.0476	0.1224	0.0724	0.2988
	(1.2969)	(0.5584)	(0.6073)	(0.5017)	(0.6513)
35-44 years	2.6805*	0.4683	0.7251	0.4364	0.3894
	(1.2851)	(0.5435)	(0.5897)	(0.4885)	(0.6465)
45-54 years	1.8452	-0.4720	0.5049	0.0543	-0.1488
	(1.2855)	(0.5440)	(0.5828)	(0.4804)	(0.6482)
55-64 years	1.8722	-0.7718	0.5647	-0.1403	-2.2572**
	(1.2898)	(0.5541)	(0.5858)	(0.4856)	(0.8470)
65+ years	2.5291	-1.2201*	0.6373	-0.5725	-3.1809**
	(1.3340)	(0.5959)	(0.6038)	(0.5141)	(1.1921)
University education	-0.3419	-0.5562*	-0.1770	-0.3777	-0.6930*
	(0.3861)	(0.2692)	(0.2501)	(0.2251)	(0.3352)
Political interest	0.6748	-0.6992	-1.0389*	-0.8776	-1.1684
	(0.8358)	(0.5502)	(0.5264)	(0.4631)	(0.6805)
Social Democrats	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Progress Party	3.0352*	-0.5485	0.4568	0.5202	-0.1963
	(1.2632)	(0.4805)	(0.3997)	(0.3268)	(0.6059)
Independence Party	4.0695***	-0.7734	0.5890	1.1221***	0.4331
	(1.1345)	(0.3999)	(0.3242)	(0.2574)	(0.4662)
Left Greens	0.6143	-2.3818**	-2.3726**	-2.1852***	-2.7561*
	(1.8556)	(0.7652)	(0.7981)	(0.5791)	(1.2086)
Pirates	1.0095	0.8798*	0.6260	0.3146	0.3212
	(1.4704)	(0.3463)	(0.3608)	(0.3418)	(0.4539)
Liberal Reform	2.8476*	0.6528*	0.2883	0.7015**	-0.1931
	(1.2000)	(0.2981)	(0.3251)	(0.2722)	(0.4871)
Center Party	5.5355***	-0.8415	0.6012	0.9089*	0.1999
	(1.0996)	(0.5851)	(0.4297)	(0.3931)	(0.6012)
People's Party	5.2572***	-0.1087	0.3221	0.2380	0.1195
	(1.2197)	(0.7080)	(0.6424)	(0.6152)	(0.7836)
Socialist Party	1.4317	-0.1900	0.3616	-0.7178	1.2292
	(1.5759)	(0.6748)	(0.6032)	(0.6673)	(0.6847)
Trust in presidency	-2.1051*	0.2011	-0.5074	0.0839	0.0884
	(0.8493)	(0.6715)	(0.6372)	(0.5722)	(0.8346)
Trust in government	-2.7512***	-3.3058***	-3.3897***	-2.9940***	-2.9476***
	(0.7786)	(0.4593)	(0.4499)	(0.3837)	(0.6210)
Role: Sign., public	3.9136***	0.1927	0.7755	1.0695**	-0.6290
	(1.1702)	(0.4966)	(0.4901)	(0.4128)	(0.6420)
Role: Sign., own	0.9894	0.1497	0.3112	-0.6839*	-0.6175
	(0.6781)	(0.3972)	(0.3812)	(0.3357)	(0.5624)
Role: Foreign	-0.2492	0.0342	0.6832	0.3701	1.4181*
	(0.7986)	(0.4929)	(0.4801)	(0.4199)	(0.6424)
Role: Politics	2.8515***	0.9883*	1.1680**	1.5041***	1.1012
	(0.7266)	(0.4415)	(0.4329)	(0.3842)	(0.5774)
Trait: Honesty	0.8975*	0.5790*	0.7242**	0.7559***	0.6973*
	(0.3898)	(0.2881)	(0.2524)	(0.2168)	(0.3395)
Trait: Comp., dom.	0.2702	0.3505	-0.0945	-0.2247	-0.3434
	(0.4220)	(0.3047)	(0.2792)	(0.2327)	(0.3666)
Trait: Comp., for.	-1.2723**	0.0720	-0.3161	-0.0619	-0.8006*
	(0.4851)	(0.2915)	(0.2628)	(0.2199)	(0.3598)

Trait: Policies	1.2674**	1.4955***	1.4515***	1.0742***	0.6723
	(0.4455)	(0.3321)	(0.3035)	(0.2751)	(0.3896)
Trait: Normal	-1.5357*	0.3941	0.5923*	-0.1719	0.5904
	(0.6376)	(0.3355)	(0.2973)	(0.2782)	(0.3592)
Trait: Presidential	-0.4109	0.4610	0.7260*	0.3033	-0.2250
	(0.5737)	(0.3535)	(0.3131)	(0.2728)	(0.4040)
Trait: Warm	-2.2521*	0.4743	1.3029***	0.6837*	0.7212
	(1.1169)	(0.3905)	(0.3354)	(0.3068)	(0.4026)
Trait: Previous	0.4453	0.8527*	0.3921	0.1206	0.2524
	(0.5007)	(0.3604)	(0.3480)	(0.3061)	(0.4209)
Trait: Knowledge	-0.7108	-0.0290	-0.7214**	-0.5346*	-1.9290***
	(0.3848)	(0.2860)	(0.2526)	(0.2199)	(0.3512)
Trait: Career	-0.1079	0.1430	0.3348	0.2866	-0.5261
	(0.6014)	(0.3825)	(0.3362)	(0.2919)	(0.5324)
Trait: Education	0.5763	1.2841**	1.4304***	-0.1127	-14.9191
	(0.6796)	(0.4290)	(0.3847)	(0.3901)	(838.0896)
Trait: Gender	-13.6468	-1.2453	-0.6522	-0.5973	-1.5797
	(1265.8758)	(0.7265)	(0.6107)	(0.4683)	(1.1263)
Trait: Sexuality	-14.4699	1.4214	-18.4744	-1.0902	-18.5887
	(7417.2222)	(1.1587)	(7010.8970)	(1.4645)	(8621.9546)
Trait: Spouse	1.6621	3.0952**	0.6170	1.3291	1.3592
	(1.6211)	(1.1957)	(1.3439)	(1.1990)	(1.3974)
Constant	-9.0524***	0.8172	0.9077	0.5493	3.0489*
	(2.2373)	(1.1007)	(1.0424)	(0.9064)	(1.2581)
Log Likelihood	-1882.8967				
N	1587.0000				

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C: Additional analysis

C1. Additional analysis from the Online Election survey



Figure C1. Average values given by respondents in the Online Elections to four questions about how desirable each would be for the president of Iceland, where 0 = “very undesirable” and 1 = “very desirable” (rescaled from 0-10)



Figure C2. Proportion of respondents in the Online Election survey who chose each candidate characteristic / trait as important for their preference over candidates for president. Each respondent could choose up to three traits



Figure C3. Demographic (and political interest) correlates of candidate choice in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election. Data from the Online Election survey

C2. Additional analysis from the Maskína survey

On the day before the election Maskína, a public opinion research firm in Iceland, fielded a survey to their probability-based online panel on the election. A total of 2,488 responses were gathered. The survey responses were weighted by age, sex, residence and education, as well as the results of the presidential elections.

Table C1 shows vote intention by government support. Halla Tómasdóttir's support is roughly equal in the two groups of voters. However, for the remaining major candidates, vote intention is strongly predicted by government support. Katrín Jakobsdóttir is the preferred candidate of almost a half of government supporters, but is only favored by 14% of those that do not support the government. The opposite is true of Halla Hrund Logadóttir, Jón Gnarr, and Baldur Þórhallsson, as they have two to three times more support among voters in opposition to the government.

Table C1. Vote intention, by government support (%)

Vote intention	Against	Supports
Halla Tómasdóttir	33	31
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	14	45
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	21	10
Jón Gnarr	13	5
Baldur Þórhallsson	12	4
Other	8	5
Total	**100**	**100**

In the Maskína poll, respondents were also asked to indicate which candidate they would vote for if their preferred candidate was not running in the election. Table C2 shows the results of this question, broken down by respondents' initial vote intention. Among voters intending to vote for one of the major candidates, Halla Tómasdóttir is by far the most popular 2nd choice. Almost half of Jakobsdóttir voters would vote for Tómasdóttir if the former was not running for office, while support among other voter groups ranges from just under 30% to 40%. Jakobsdóttir herself, however, does not fare well when it comes to being the 2nd choice of other voters. Only around 10% of Logadóttir, Gnarr, and Þórhallsson voters would shift their vote to her, while 23% of Tómasdóttir voters would make the switch.

Table C2. Respondents' 2nd best vote, by main vote (%)

	Vote intention					
2nd best vote	**HT**	**KJ**	**HHL**	**JG**	**BÞ**	**Other**
Halla Tómasdóttir	0	46	40	29	37	27
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	23	0	9	12	13	1
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	20	12	0	11	18	20
Jón Gnarr	21	17	13	0	21	20
Baldur Þórhallsson	23	16	20	22	0	1
Other	12	8	18	26	12	31
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

The above analysis suggests that voters were clearly divided along government lines and that this division holds even when allowing for a hypothetical backup vote. Table C3 paints an even starker image in this respect. When asked which of the five major candidates they were least likely to support, between 50% and 70% of the voters of other candidates stated that they were least likely to vote for Jakobsdóttir. On the opposite end of the spectrum - and mirroring the findings above - Tómasdóttir was the least polarizing candidate, with 7-13% of other voters ranking her last.

Table C3. Respondents' least likely vote choice of major candidates, by vote intention (%)

	Vote intention					
Least likely vote	**HT**	**KJ**	**HHL**	**JG**	**BÞ**	**Other**
Halla Tómasdóttir	0	13	9	6	8	7
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	51	0	67	65	58	61
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	20	41	0	20	18	7
Jón Gnarr	19	28	15	0	16	12
Baldur Þórhallsson	10	17	8	9	0	13
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

In the Maskína survey, a series of three hypothetical questions on polling information on election day also gives us an alternative way to evaluate the extent of strategic voting. Specifically, respondents were asked: "If polls on election day suggest that two candidates were most likely to win the election, would you vote for either of them or another candidate?" The three scenarios all included Jakobsdóttir as a front runner, with either Tómasdóttir, Logadóttir or Þórhallsson being the opponent. Note that these

can be considered lower bounds for strategic voting, as some voters could already have intended to vote strategically for a particular candidate.

Table C4 combines answers from these three questions and indicates if respondents who intend to vote for other candidates than the two hypothetical front runners would 1) switch their vote to Jakobsdóttir, 2) switch their vote to the opponent (Tómasdóttir, Logadóttir, or Þórhallsson, depending on the question), or 3) vote for neither (either not changing their vote or vote for another candidate). The answers suggest that polling information would be highly relevant for respondents' eventual vote choice, with 50-70% of voters of other candidates indicating they would change their vote to one of the front runners. Again, collective opposition to Jakobsdóttir's presidential bid can be seen in the breakdown of answers, as voters would much rather switch their vote to whomever was opposing her.

Þórhallsson's fortunes would have changed dramatically if he had been in that position, as 53% of voters intending to vote for someone else than him or Jakobsdóttir would have switch their vote to him and only 20% to Jakobsdóttir. Tómasdóttir would have seen a similar gain, with 43% of voters switching their vote to her and only 10% to Jakobsdóttir. In her case, however, a much larger share of voters would have left their vote choice unchanged, indicating that neither of them appealed enough to some segment of voters.

Table C4. Vote changing by other voters if Katrín Jakobsdóttir and one of three opponents were the frontrunners in polls on election day (%)

	Hypothetical opponent		
Effect on vote choice	**vs HT**	**vs HHL**	**vs BÞ**
Switch to KJ	10	22	20
Switch to opponent	43	42	53
Vote for neither	46	36	27
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**

In the Maskína survey, respondents were also asked to order the twelve candidates by how likely they were to vote for them on election day. While the question is not explicitly asking respondents to rank the candidates under an alternative vote (AV) system, we analyze the results as if they were. A reasonable criticism of this approach is that the question wording does not lead to responses that elicit the preference ordering of respondents under AV, as their first vote choice (and so on) might already be based on strategic considerations. Of all respondents, 2,248 respondents ordered at least candidate and just under half of those gave a complete ranking of all candidates.

Based on answers to this question, the results of the election would have been unchanged under an alternative vote system, and the order of candidates almost the same as reported in the main text, based on the Online Election. The final three candidates

would have been Halla Tómasdóttir, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, and Halla Hrund Logadóttir, with Halla Tómasdóttir beating Katrín Jakobsdóttir in the final round with 66% of the vote against 34%. The figure below shows the order in which candidates dropped out of the race and the effects on the vote tallies of the remaining candidates.



Figure C4. Evolution of candidates' votes over AV rounds, based on data from the Maskína survey

Respondents were also asked to indicate who they would be "content with" (i. "sátt(ur)" með) as the next President of Iceland. While the question is not asking respondents directly about whether they would cast an approval vote for each of the candidates, we believe it is reasonable to analyze the results is if they were. Of all respondents, 2,413 respondents were content with at least one of the candidates winning the election.

Based on answers to this question, the winner of the election would have been unchanged under an approval vote system, with over 70% of voters being content with Halla Tómasdóttir as the president. However, the order of the runners-up would have been somewhat different: Baldur Þórhallsson would have finished 2nd with 53% approval, Halla Hrund Logadóttir 3rd with 48% approval, Katrín Jakobsdóttir 4th with 47% approval, and Jón Gnarr fifth with 45% approval. Other candidates would have received less than 20% of votes. The results can be seen in Table C5 and these are very similar to those reported in the main text, based on the Online Election survey.

Table C5. Results of approval "vote", based on Maskína data

Candidate	Votes (%)
Halla Tómasdóttir	71
Baldur Þórhallsson	53
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	48
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	47
Jón Gnarr	45
Arnar Þór Jónsson	18
Steinunn Ólína Þorsteinsdóttir	18
Helga Þórisdóttir	7
Ásdís Rán Gunnarsdóttir	6
Viktor Traustason	6
Ástþór Magnússon Wium	3
Eiríkur Ingi Jóhannsson	2

C3. Additional analysis from the SSRI survey

To further investigate the notion of strategic voting in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election, we also look at the SSRI post-election survey, weighting survey responses to reflect the vote shares obtained in the presidential election. This survey is based on a sample drawn from a probability-based online panel maintained by the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland. A total of 1,571 responses were gathered. Three items in this survey dealt with issues related to strategic voting. The first of these measured whether voters should consider voting strategically. A large majority (78%) of respondents opposed strategic voting. When the results are broken down by candidate (focusing on those reaching 5% of the overall vote), the rates of approval of strategic voting were highest among voters of two candidates: Halla Tómasdóttir, the elected candidate, and Halla Hrund Logadóttir, who came in third. While a minority of respondents approved of strategic voting, the share that does is sufficient to affect the results of a close election.

Table C7. Should voters choose strategically or sincerely?

	Voters should always choose the candidate they think will be best suited to be president, even if that candidate is unlikely to win the election	Voters should choose the candidate they think most likely to affect the result of the election, even if they think that candidate is not the one will be best suited to be president
Total	**995 (78%)**	**276 (22%)**
Halla Tómasdóttir	307 (72%)	122 (28%)
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	282 (85%)	49 (15%)
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	142 (72%)	55 (28%)
Jón Gnarr	108 (86%)	18 (14%)
Baldur Þórhallsson	91 (84%)	17 (16%)
Arnar Þór Jónsson	55 (86%)	9 (14%)
Other	11 (67%)	5 (33%)

Note: Respondents were asked: "Following the presidential election there has been some discussion regarding tactical elections, referring to voting for the candidate thought most likely to affect the results of the election, rather than the candidate they think will be the best president. XXXX"
$p<0.001$ (chi-squared test with Rao & Scott's second-order correction)

Following up on the previous item, which explained the concept of strategic voting, respondents were asked if they had voted strategically themselves. A much smaller share of respondents' self-reports having voted strategically, as only around one in eight respondents (13%) do so. An interesting picture emerges when examining self-reported strategic voting by candidates, as this phenomenon is almost exclusively reported by voters of the three candidates who received the most votes. Notably, a full quarter (25%) of respond-

ents who cast their vote for the election winner, Halla Tómasdóttir, self-report having voted for her for strategic reasons. Thus, the rate of strategic voting for the election winner is nearly double that of the full sample. Another candidate who benefited from strategic voting was Halla Hrund Logadóttir, of whom 17% reported having voted for strategically. The runner-up, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, received comparatively little benefit from strategic voting, although 7% reported having voted for her strategically.

Does this large share of strategic votes indicate that Halla Tómasdóttir would not have won the election without strategic votes? Halla received 34.15% of the vote, while runner-up Katrín Jakobsdóttir received 25.19%, a margin of nine percentage points. This margin exceeds the point estimate for the share of the overall sample that self-reported voting strategically for Halla (8.5%), although it is within the margin of error (±1.4%), meaning that we cannot rule out that strategic voting was decisive based on this analysis. Two other factors muddle the figure further, as some may have voted strategically for Halla to block another candidate than Katrín, and Katrín may have benefited from strategic voting herself. However, less than 1% of the sample reported both having considered voting for Katrín and having voted strategically for Halla, and Katrín Jakobsdóttir's benefit from strategic voting was less than 2% of the overall vote. Overall, these findings suggest that strategic voting substantially contributed to Halla Tómasdóttir's margin of victory, although we cannot conclude whether she would have won the election without strategic votes.

Table C8. Do voters self-report having voted strategically?

	Yes, I voted for a candidate that I believed was likely to win despite not being the candidate I believed would be best suited to be president	**No, I voted for the candidate I believed would be best suited to be president**
Total	**193 (13%)**	**1277 (87%)**
Halla Tómasdóttir	122 (25%)	371 (75%)
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	24 (7%)	349 (93%)
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	39 (17%)	192 (83%)
Jón Gnarr	2 (2%)	148 (98%)
Baldur Þórhallsson	3 (3%)	122 (97%)
Arnar Þór Jónsson	1 (2%)	75 (98%)
Other	0 (0%)	21 (100%)

Note: Respondents were asked: "Did you vote strategically in the presidential election on June 1st, 2024?"
$p<0.001$ (chi-squared test with Rao & Scott's second-order correction)

Respondents were asked whether they believed others had voted strategically. The results indicate that around one in three (32%) believe a large share voted strategically, which far exceeds the share who self-reported doing so (13%), and the share who believe

voting strategically is justifiable (22%). This indicates, perhaps unsurprisingly, that voters exaggerate the amount of strategic voting based on their expectations of the motives of others. Again, noticeable trends emerge when examining the results by candidate, as those who voted for Halla Tómasdóttir are less likely to believe that a large share of the electorate voted strategically.

Table C9. How many voters do respondents believe vote strategically?

	Yes, a large share voted strategically	Yes, some voted strategically	Yes, but only a small share voted strategically	No, no voters or almost no voters voted strategically
Total	**400 (32%)**	**600 (47%)**	**230 (18%)**	**34 (3%)**
Halla Tómasdóttir	81 (19%)	182 (44%)	138 (33%)	18 (4%)
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	115 (36%)	176 (55%)	20 (6%)	5 (2%)
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	67 (33%)	98 (49%)	32 (16%)	5 (2%)
Jón Gnarr	54 (40%)	60 (44%)	19 (14%)	2 (2%)
Baldur Þórhallsson	43 (39%)	55 (50%)	9 (8%)	2 (2%)
Arnar Þór Jónsson	26 (41%)	29 (45%)	7 (11%)	1 (2%)
Other	13 (71%)	0 (0%)	5 (29%)	0 (0%)

Note: Respondents were asked: "Do you believe other voters voted strategically in the presidential election held on June 1st, 2024?"
$p<0.001$ (chi-squared test with Rao & Scott's second-order correction)

Finally, Figure C5 shows which candidates voters considered voting for, beyond the candidate they eventually selected. Respondents were asked "did you consider voting for ..." each of the candidates. As the figure illustrates, Halla Tómasdóttir had a broad appeal among the electorate, as 72.2% either voted for her or considered voting for her. In comparison, her two closest competitors were considered by less than half the electorate, with Katrín Jakobsdóttir (considered by 44.4%) in particular facing a narrow electorate (Halla Hrund Logadóttir was considered by 49.2% of respondents).



Figure C5. Which candidates were considered?

This analysis of the probability-based post-election survey indicates that strategic voting played an important role in the 2024 Icelandic presidential election, as one in eight voters self-reported having voted strategically, including one in four who voted for the winning candidate. While we cannot conclude whether Halla Tómasdóttir would have won the election without these votes, it seems clear that strategic voting changed the election from a close contest to a relatively convincing margin of victory for a newly elected president. Furthermore, while voters suspect others of voting strategically, this phenomenon appears to be relatively rare and less than a quarter of the sample believes strategic voting is ever justifiable. Despite this, the extent of strategic voting in Icelandic elections is clearly a factor that can sway close presidential elections.

C4. Additional analysis from the Prósent survey

The public opinion research firm Prósent conducted a survey about the Icelandic presidential election on May 27th-28th 2024, using their online panel of respondents. This survey gathered 1438 responses and asked respondents a) who they would vote for as president, b) who they would vote for if that candidate was not running, and c) who they would vote for if that candidate was not running. The data are weighted by candidate support (first vote choice) to reflect the election results. Figure C6 uses these questions to count votes for each of the candidates using the AV rule, again with the caveat that the questions did not explicitly ask respondents to vote under the AV system. The results are entirely consistent with the results from the Online Election and Maskína data: the order in which the major candidates are eliminated in the counting procedure is the same as in the Maskína survey, and Tómasdóttir would have beaten Jakobsdóttir in the final round with 62% of the vote against 38%.



Figure C6. Evolution of candidates' votes over AV rounds, based on data from the Prósent survey

In Table C10, we use these questions to infer which candidate might have been preferred to the other in hypothetical two-way competitions between each of the six major candidates, like in Table 2 in the main text.

Table C10. Which candidates were "preferred" by more voters? Results from the Prósent survey. Weighted by candidate vote (first choice)

	Pairwise "opponent" (%)					
Candidate (%)	**vs AÞJ**	**vs BÞ**	**vs HHL**	**vs HT**	**vs JG**	**vs KJ**
Arnar Þór Jónsson		22	22	12	31	22
Baldur Þórhallsson	78		53	32	63	45
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	78	47		31	58	45
Halla Tómasdóttir	88	68	69		76	63
Jón Gnarr	69	37	42	24		39
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	78	55	55	37	61	

Note: Respondents were asked to rank candidates in order of how likely they were to vote for them. Here, we treat this as a measure of respondents preferences over the candidates and use their ranking to infer how each pair of candidates might have fared against each other in a two-way contest, with the caveat that this is a hypothetical case based on a question that did not directly ask about this.

Table C11. Respondents' 2nd best vote, by main vote (%) - Prósent survey

	Vote intention						
2nd best vote	**HT**	**KJ**	**HHL**	**JG**	**BÞ**	**AÞJ**	**Other**
Halla Tómasdóttir	0	42	38	21	39	35	15
Katrín Jakobsdóttir	30	0	8	9	12	4	3
Halla Hrund Logadóttir	22	11	0	10	21	15	21
Jón Gnarr	13	6	8	0	19	13	23
Baldur Þórhallsson	23	34	27	33	0	0	8
Arnar Þór Jónsson	8	2	8	4	2	0	12
Other	5	5	12	22	8	33	19
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**